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INTRODUCTION 
As the adage goes, in this world, nothing can be said to be certain, 
except death and taxes.  Although this invariably proves to be true, tax 
reform remains a central aspect of every election.  With the 2020 
election approaching, the public should expect to hear more about the 
taxation of carried interest, as it remains a major point of controversy 
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within the world of tax law.1  Specifically, carried interest is a portion 
of the profits of a private investment fund that is distributed to fund 
managers as compensation for a fund reaching a certain threshold of 
profitability.2  Controversially, if fund managers hold the underlying 
asset for a minimum of three years, the resulting carried interest is 
currently taxed as a long-term capital gain at a maximum rate of 20%.3  
If fund managers hold the underlying asset for less than this three-year 
holding period, the resulting carried interest is taxed as a short-term 
capital gain at a rate of approximately 40%.4  Yet, commentators claim 
all carried interest should be taxed as ordinary income, which is taxed 
at a maximum rate of approximately 40%.5 
President Donald Trump made fixing this “tax loophole” a central 
promise of his 2016 campaign.6  Despite passing ground-breaking tax 
reform in the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, however, the carried interest 
loophole remains largely untouched.7  The only significant reform 
occurred in Section 1061 of the Internal Revenue Code, which 
increased the holding period requirement from one year to a minimum 
of three years, in order for carried interest to qualify for long-term 
capital gains tax treatment.8  Not surprisingly, private investment fund 
managers have utilized and designed various structures to circumvent 
this requirement.9  Moreover, even under the assumption that the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would challenge such structures, the 
three-year holding requirement does not affect hedge fund or private 
equity fund managers.  Specifically, hedge funds generally hold assets 
for less than one year, so carried interest distributed to hedge fund 
managers was not receiving preferential long-term capital gains tax 
 
 1. See The Taxation of Carried Interest: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways 
& Means, 110th Cong. 7 (2007) [hereinafter The Taxation of Carried Interest] 
(statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office). 
 2. See id. 
 3. I.R.C. §§ 1, 1061 (2019). 
 4. Id. §§ 1, 1061. 
 5. Id. § 1; The Taxation of Carried Interest, supra note 1, at 7. 
 6. Alan Rappeport, Trump Promised to Kill Carried Interest. Lobbyists Kept it 
Alive, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/22/business/trump-carried-interest-lobbyists.html 
[https://perma.cc/QE2D-XLUT]. 
 7. See id. 
 8. I.R.C. § 1061. 
 9. See generally Scott Dolson et al., 2019 Update — How to Deal with Section 
1061’s Three Year Holding Period Requirement for Carried Interests, FROST BROWN 
TODD: TAX L. DEFINED BLOG (June 14, 2019), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9a5f0c8e-983d-491f-99ae-
ee0dde192696 [https://perma.cc/8MWQ-DWWS]. 
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treatment under the previous law.10  Furthermore, private equity funds 
generally hold assets for far longer than three years, making Section 
1061 ineffective for private equity fund managers.11 
Although arguments present strong points in favor or against 
amending the relevant laws, carried interest should not be taxed solely 
as a long-term capital gain or as ordinary income.  Specifically, Section 
1061 should be tightened to more effectively limit the ability of fund 
managers to gain long-term capital gain tax treatment, but also allow 
such treatment in certain circumstances.  An increase in the minimum 
holding period requirement from three years to a five- to seven-year 
period, an expansion in the definition of “related parties,” and bringing 
other types of investments into its purview would make Section 1061 
more effective. This additional tax revenue would amount to billions 
of dollars and would have a significant effect on many indebted urban 
areas.12  Yet, legislators must keep in mind that private investment 
funds bring jobs, philanthropic endeavors, and economic growth to 
American cities, especially New York City.13  Thus, a properly drafted 
revision should continue to incentivize fund formation and allow 
private investment funds to continue to help urban economies thrive. 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of carried interest and 
analyzes Section 1061’s stipulations and its resulting industry-wide 
effects with a focus on hedge funds and private equity funds.  Part II 
discusses the arguments in favor of and against taxation of carried 
interest as a long-term capital gain.  Part III argues that carried interest 
should not be taxed solely as a long-term capital gain or as ordinary 
income, and that Section 1061 should be altered to further limit such 
preferential tax treatment while properly incentivizing fund formation.  
Part III concludes by illustrating how a properly drafted revision to 
Section 1061 is significant to New York City. 
 
 10. See Scott Dolson, How New IRC § 1061 Impacts Carried Interests, FROST 
BROWN TODD: LEGAL UPDATE (Feb. 26, 2018), https://frostbrowntodd.com/how-new-
irc-%C2%A7-1061-impacts-carried-interests-2/ [https://perma.cc/8WUF-MCEL]. 
 11. See id. 
 12. CITIZENS BUDGET COMM’N, NYC DEBT OUTSTANDING: FISCAL YEARS 2002–
2018 (2018); Victor Fleischer, How a Carried Interest Tax Could Raise $180 Billion, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/06/business/dealbook/how-a-carried-interest-tax-
could-raise-180-billion.html [https://perma.cc/V9DQ-S5KB] [hereinafter Fleischer, 
Carried Interest Tax]. 
 13. Charles Swenson, Economic Impact Analysis: Proposed New York State Tax 
Increases on Carried Interest of the Private Funds Industry, AM. INV. COUNCIL 3, 5 
(2019). 
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I. CARRIED INTEREST: AN OVERVIEW 
A. Carried Interest and I.R.C. Section 1061 
Carried interest is the primary means by which private investment 
fund managers are compensated.14  Private investment funds are 
typically organized as limited partnerships with investors as the limited 
partners and fund managers as the general partners.15  The fund 
managers determine investments that the fund makes, and the fund 
generates gains or losses through the operation of the investments 
made by fund managers.16  As per partnership tax law, the resulting 
gains or losses flow through to the partners.17  Carried interest is 
distributed to fund managers if the fund reaches a certain threshold of 
profitability.18  If fund managers do not hold the underlying investment 
for a minimum of three years, the resulting carried interest is being 
taxed as a short-term capital gain at a maximum rate of approximately 
39.6%.19  However, if fund managers hold the underlying investment 
for a minimum of three years, the resulting carried interest is currently 
taxed as a long-term capital gain at a maximum rate of 20%.20  In 
response to critics, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act addresses this issue in 
I.R.C. Section 1061.21  Tax planning strategies and the general nature 
of certain private investment funds reveal that Section 1061’s new 
three-year holding period requirement is relatively ineffective.22 
 
 14. Daniel Feldman, Carried Interest: “That Is Pure Poppycock!”, 12 RUTGERS J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 513, 513–14 (2015). 
 15. In a limited partnership, general partners typically control major business 
decisions and face unlimited personal liability. On the other hand, limited partners are 
usually passive investors and only liable up to the extent of their investments. Thus, 
limited partnerships allow fund managers to maintain control over investment 
decisions and also allow limited partners to invest without fear of unlimited liability. 
See id. at 516; Colleen DeBaise, Forming a Partnership, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 8, 2010), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704869304575109770640885814 
[https://perma.cc/99VM-WLN4]. 
 16. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 516. 
 17. I.R.C. § 704(b) (2019). 
 18. See The Taxation of Carried Interest, supra note 1, at 7. 
 19. I.R.C. §§ 1, 1061 (2019). 
 20. Id. §§ 1, 1061. 
 21. See id. § 1061; Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in 
Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 35 (2008) [hereinafter Fleischer, Two and 
Twenty] (exemplifying how Professor Victor Fleischer has been a significant critic of 
the preferential tax treatment of carried interest and advocates for reform in this area); 
Rappeport, supra note 6. 
 22. See Dolson et al., supra note 9. 
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Hedge fund and private equity fund managers are some of the 
wealthiest people in the world.23  The taxation of their compensation 
arrangements is an area of constant debate and a major controversy in 
tax law.24  Private investment funds typically follow what is known as a 
“two and twenty” compensation structure.25  The 2% refers to the 
minimal portion of their income that is composed of a management 
fee.26  Specifically, this annual management fee is guaranteed in the 
partnership agreement and is taxed as ordinary income.27  The 20% 
refers to the portion of a fund manager’s income that is deemed a 
profits interest.28  The profits interest is not guaranteed, as it is 
incentive-based.29  Under a typical arrangement, a fund manager 
usually sets a certain threshold of profitability that he must surpass and, 
upon reaching the threshold, is able to garner a share of the profits.30  
Subject to some slight restrictions, this profits interest can be taxed as 
a long-term capital gain at a maximum rate of 20% with an additional 
3.8% surtax of net investment income tax.31  For example, if a private 
investment fund manager formed a fund and investors made an initial 
total investment of $1,000,000, under a two and twenty compensation 
structure, the manager would be allocated a management fee of 2% or 
$20,000.32  If the fund performs over a designated threshold, such as a 
profit of $500,000, the manager would get 20% of the profit or 
$100,000.33 
Since some investment funds invest relatively aggressively, these 
fees can reach extraordinarily high amounts, but such aggressive 
investments also run the risk of generating losses for investors.34  The 
 
 23. See Tom Maloney, The Best-Paid Hedge Fund Managers Made $7.7 Billion in 
2018, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-
15/the-10-best-paid-hedge-fund-managers-made-7-7-billion-in-2018 
[https://perma.cc/3PFJ-VMMJ]. 
 24. See Rappeport, supra note 6. 
 25. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 513–14. 
 26. See id. 
 27. I.R.C. §§ 1, 1061 (2019); Feldman, supra note 14, at 513–14. 
 28. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 513–14. 
 29. See id. at 516. 
 30. The Taxation of Carried Interest, supra note 1, at 7. 
 31. I.R.C. §§ 1, 1061; David Rae, What Are the New Capital Gains Rates for 2020?, 
FORBES (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidrae/2020/01/13/new-capital-
gains-rates-for-2020/#71c09ef843eb [https://perma.cc/YK3J-9FVP]. 
 32. See Anne Sraders, What Is a Hedge Fund and How Do They Work?, 
THESTREET (July 23, 2019), https://www.thestreet.com/personal-
finance/education/what-is-a-hedge-fund-14662109 [https://perma.cc/5JAA-DLSG]. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. The potential for large losses was especially evident in the collapse of 
Tiger Management. Before its eventual closing, the hedge fund suffered losses of 19% 
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preferential tax treatment of carried interest is so significant that 
investment fund managers often forfeit a portion of their annual 
management fee in exchange for a higher amount of carried interest.35  
These fee waivers have become very common and allow fund managers 
to forego the typical 2% management fee that would be taxed as 
ordinary income.36  Instead, these fund managers can, therefore, earn 
a higher rate of carried interest with its potential tax benefits.37  
Moreover, since fund managers typically invest their own money into 
the fund, the profits distributed based upon a fund manager’s invested 
capital is often treated as a capital gain, subject to some slight 
restrictions.38 
Due to the significant amount of wealth involved, a constant debate 
surrounds the preferential tax treatment of carried interest.39  
Proponents of the preferential tax treatment claim that carried interest 
is based upon the vicissitudes of the markets and is not guaranteed, 
making long-term capital gains treatment most logical.40  Moreover, 
these proponents rely on other various taxation-based arguments and 
public policy rationales.41  On the other hand, critics of the current tax 
treatment of carried interest liken carried interest to a bonus, and 
affirm that it most logically should be taxed as ordinary income at a 
maximum rate of approximately 40%.42  Similarly, these critics rely on 
a variety of other taxation and public policy-related arguments.43 
Congress has previously attempted to reform the taxation of carried 
interest.44  These proposals have ranged from the full taxation of 
carried interest as ordinary income to approaches categorizing carried 
interest as a blend of ordinary and capital gains income.45  In 2007, 
 
in 1999 alone. See Gregory Zuckerman et al., Fallout of Tiger Management’s Collapse 
on Asian Markets Should Be Limited, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2000), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB954443007478201408 [https://perma.cc/A5HZ-38VW]. 
 35. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 518–19. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. I.R.C. § 1 (2018); Sraders, supra note 32. 
 39. DONALD MARRON, URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INST.: TAX POL’Y CTR., 
GOLDILOCKS MEETS PRIVATE EQUITY: TAXING CARRIED INTEREST JUST RIGHT 1 
(2016), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/goldilocks-meets-private-equity-
taxing-carried-interest-just-right/view/full_report [https://perma.cc/2GB6-EQ93]. 
 40. Id. at 2. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. at 1; I.R.C. § 1. 
 43. MARRON, supra note 39, at 1. 
 44. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 526–27. 
 45. DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22689, TAXATION OF HEDGE 
FUND AND PRIVATE EQUITY MANAGERS 4 (2014). 
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Representative Charles B. Rangel introduced a tax reform bill — H.R. 
3970 — that would have been included in the Temporary Tax Relief 
Act of 2007.46  Specifically, this bill proposed I.R.C. Section 710, which 
would have effectively changed the taxation of any “investment 
services partnership interest.”47  The proposed Section 710 would have 
treated the distributive share of carried interest as compensation 
income and, therefore, would have taxed fund managers at the 
applicable ordinary income rates.48 
Specifically, Section 710(a)(1), as proposed by Representative 
Rangel, would have treated the net income arising from investment 
service partnership interests as ordinary income regardless of the 
character of the underlying asset.49  This proposed version of Section 
710 would have only applied to partnerships focused on investing in 
securities, commodities, or real estate and to a partner providing 
substantial services consisting of investment advice or asset 
management.50  This type of partnership was referred to as an 
investment services partnership and the described investment services 
were intended to cover the activities of private investment fund 
managers.51  The proposed Section 710 did not characterize as ordinary 
income the portion of a partner’s distributive share that consisted of 
the partner’s invested capital.52  To avoid such recharacterization, the 
bill required such invested capital allocations to be reasonable.53  To 
be deemed reasonable, an allocation to invested capital of a partner 
providing investment services could not be in excess of the amount 
allocated to the partners not providing such services.54 
Representative Rangel’s proposed Section 710 has not yet been 
passed,55 and received significant criticism from tax experts.56  
Professor Howard E. Abrams criticized the proposed Section 710, 
 
 46. Howard E. Abrams, Taxation of Carried Interests: The Reform That Did Not 
Happen, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 197, 211–12 (2009) [hereinafter Abrams, Taxation of 
Carried Interests]. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. at 213. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. at 223; see also id. at 198, 212 (citing Howard E. Abrams, A Close Look 
at the Carried Interest Legislation, 117 TAX NOTES 961, 970–71 (2007) [hereinafter 
Abrams, A Close Look]). 
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emphasizing the great difficulties surrounding the recharacterization of 
a portion of carried interest as ordinary income without considering the 
underlying investment.57  Moreover, Professor Abrams claimed that 
the proposed bill was an overly simplistic solution to a complicated 
issue.  Professor Abrams felt such arbitrary re-characterization of 
income was directly contrary to the rudimentary principle that the tax 
law should treat partners equally.  Furthermore, it is advantageous that 
income passes from a partnership to partners without any tax 
modifications.58 
In 2007, Senator Sander Levin introduced a tax reform bill to 
Congress within the Temporary Tax Relief Act of 2007.59  This bill 
proposed to treat income received by general partners for the 
performance of investment management services as ordinary income 
regardless of the character of the underlying assets.60  This bill was 
drafted very broadly, applying to investment services partnerships and 
to entities not classified as investment services partnerships.61  
Congress did not support this proposal, as it was introduced in the 
House of Representatives and ultimately was not passed.62 
In 2009, Senator Levin introduced a bill as part of the Job Creation 
and Tax Cuts Act of 2010.63  This bill proposed to set a fixed percentage 
of partnership distributions distributed to fund managers of investment 
management partnerships as ordinary income and a fixed percentage 
as capital gains income.64  Under this proposed Section 710, a fixed 
percentage of carried interest would be taxed at ordinary income rates, 
notwithstanding the original character of the income and if it would 
have been treated as capital gains.65  Moreover, a fixed percentage 
would keep pass-through capital gains character.66  In an effort to 
compromise with proponents of the current tax treatment of carried 
 
 57. Professor Abrams emphasized the difficulties of recharacterizing carried 
interest regardless of the character of the underlying investments by saying that “the 
current manner of taxing carried interests is more consistent with general principles of 
taxation than is admitted by its critics . . . .” Abrams, Taxation of Carried Interests, 
supra note 46, at 198; see also Abrams, A Close Look, supra note 56, at 970–71. 
 58. Abrams, A Close Look, supra note 56, at 970–71; Abrams, Taxation of Carried 
Interests, supra note 46, at 198–99. 
 59. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 526–27. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. 
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interest, the bill proposed a 75/25 split, meaning 75% of a carried 
interest would be treated as ordinary income and 25% would retain 
pass through capital gains character.67 
Tax experts criticized Senator Levin’s 2009 proposal because it 
directly conflicted with the basic principle of Schedule K — that 
partnership income flows through to partners without any changes.68  
Moreover, scholars indicated that the bill was far too simple of a 
solution to an extraordinarily complex issue.69  Like the 2007 bill 
proposed by Senator Levin, this bill was introduced in the House of 
Representatives and died in a House Subcommittee.70 
The 113th Congress’s S. 268 and President Obama’s FY2014 Budget 
Proposal also proposed relatively significant reforms in the taxation of 
carried interest.71  Both proposals sought to tax carried interest as 
ordinary income, but made exceptions for enterprise value.72  The 
value of private investment funds is partially composed of goodwill, 
which is typically referred to as enterprise value.73  There is no clear 
way to tax enterprise value, as scholars indicate that it has both 
ordinary and capital gains characteristics.74  Both proposals recognized 
the dual nature of enterprise value and sought to allow enterprise value 
that is unrelated to providing investment services and distinct from 
other types of partnership value to be taxed as capital gains.75  
Moreover, each proposal would have taxed the remainder of carried 
interest resulting from investment partnerships at ordinary income 
rates.76  According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, Congress’s 
proposal would have raised $3.1 billion in tax revenues from 2014 to 
2023.77  Furthermore, President Obama’s proposal would have raised 
$17.4 billion in tax revenues from 2014 to 2023.78  Like other attempts 
at carried interest tax reform, S. 268 was introduced in the Senate and 
 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Tax scholars have argued that simply recharacterizing carried interest would 
alter the fundamental principle of the pass-through taxation of partnerships and would 
carry significant consequences. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 527. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See MARPLES, supra note 45, at 6. 
 72. See id. at 6–7. 
 73. Goodwill is typically described as the excess of a partnership’s value over its 
physical assets and future income streams. See id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. at 5. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. 
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died, and President Obama’s carried interest proposal was not included 
in the budget.79 
Throughout his 2016 presidential campaign, then-candidate Donald 
Trump consistently pledged to close the hedge fund “tax loophole,” in 
reference to the preferential tax treatment of carried interest.80  During 
the finalization of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, White House 
economic advisor Gary Cohn pushed for significant reform in the area, 
attempting to have the Act treat carried interests as ordinary income.81  
By contrast, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin emphasized 
preserving the current tax treatment as much as possible but adding 
small revisions.82  In the end, Mnuchin prevailed, and the 2017 Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act did little to address the issue.83  The new statute — 
Section 1061 — is the major revision related to carried interest.84 
Section 1061 was signed into law on December 22, 2017 and is 
effective for tax years beginning after 2017.85  In part, Section 1061 
states: 
(a) In general. If one or more applicable partnership interests are held 
by a taxpayer at any time during the taxable year, the excess (if any) 
of — 
(1) the taxpayer’s net long-term capital gain with respect to such 
interests for such taxable year, over 
(2) the taxpayer’s net long-term capital gain with respect to such 
interests for such taxable year computed by applying paragraphs 
(3) and (4) of sections 1222 by substituting “3 years” for “1 year”, 
 
 79. See Hunter Walker, Obama Still Wants to Kill Wall Street’s Favorite Tax 
Loophole, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 3, 2014, 8:00 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/obama-fiscal-year-2015-budget-2014-3 
[https://perma.cc/MN84-BMHA]. 
 80. President Trump “called hedge fund managers ‘paper pushers’ who were 
‘getting away with murder’ partly because of measures including the carried-interest 
provision that he said allowed them to shield their wealth and to minimize their tax 
burdens.” Tiffany Hsu, Trump Vowed End to Key Wall St. Loophole. G.O.P. Tax Plan 
Leaves It Intact, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/business/trump-carried-interest-tax-
loophole.html [https://perma.cc/2QU5-VWT4]. 
 81. Dolson et al., supra note 9. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. 2017 Tax Reform Enacts a Three-Year Holding Period Rule for Carried 
Interests, BAKER TILLY (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.bakertilly.com/insights/2017-tax-
reform-enacts-a-three-year-holding-period-rule-for-carried-interes/ 
[https://perma.cc/C4SD-TNV3] [hereinafter 2017 Tax Reform]. 
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shall be treated as short-term capital gain, notwithstanding 
section 83 or any election in effect under section 83(b).86 
In comparison to the previous law, Section 1061 imposes a more 
significant holding period requirement before carried interest receives 
preferential long-term capital gains tax treatment.87  For example, 
previously, funds only needed to hold the underlying asset for a 
minimum of one year before the resulting carried interest would be 
taxed at long-term capital gains rates.88  However, given the changes of 
Section 1061, the underlying asset would need to be held for a 
minimum of three years for the resulting carried interest to be treated 
as a long-term capital gain.89  If the underlying asset was not held for 
three years, the carried interest would be taxed at the higher short-term 
capital gains rates.90 
Section 1061(c)(1) defines an applicable partnership interest to 
mean “any interest in a partnership which, directly or indirectly, is 
transferred to (or is held by) the taxpayer in connection with the 
performance of substantial services by the taxpayer, or any other 
related person, in any applicable trade or business.”91  Thus, a fund 
manager’s management and structuring of the fund fits within this 
definition of applicable partnership interest.92 
Furthermore, the term “applicable trade or business” is defined to 
mean: 
[A]ny activity conducted on a regular, continuous, and substantial 
basis which, regardless of whether the activity is conducted in one or 
more entities, consists, in whole or in part, of – 
(A) raising or returning capital, and 
(B) either — 
(i) investing in (or disposing of) specified assets (or identifying 
specified assets for such investing or disposition), or 
(ii) developing specified assets.93 
Specifically, the “applicable trade or business” designation 
delineates what types of businesses fall within the purview of Section 
 
 86. I.R.C. § 1061 (2019). 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Dolson et al., supra note 9. 
 93. I.R.C. § 1061. 
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1061.94  Since Section 1061(c)(1) provides that Section 1061 applies to 
raising capital and investing in specified assets, the continuous and 
substantial work of managing a private investment fund qualifies as an 
“applicable trade or business.”95  Section 1061 also defines “specified 
assets” as securities, commodities, real estate held for rental or 
investment, cash, and options or derivative contracts with respect to 
any of these assets.96  Thus, Section 1061 clearly addresses the taxation 
of carried interest,97 and its three-year holding period requirement 
applies to capital gains realized by the partnership regardless of when 
the individual acquired the applicable partnership interest.98 
Although Section 1061 modified the traditional treatment of carried 
interest, the statute has a major inadequacy.99  Specifically, it contains 
an exception that removed almost all of the teeth of the new rule.100  In 
part, Section 1061 states “the term ‘applicable partnership interest’ 
shall not include . . . any interest in a partnership directly or indirectly 
held by a corporation.”101  The legal community quickly noticed that 
the corporation exception did not explicitly say it was solely for C 
corporations.102  Thus, private investment fund managers quickly 
began forming S corporations to take advantage of the corporation 
exception and to continue to receive preferential tax treatment of 
carried interest.103  In Notice 2018-18, however, the IRS fixed this 
loophole by stating that Section 1061 does apply to S corporations.104  
Therefore, private investment fund managers, who formed S or C 
corporations are likely subject to Section 1061.105 
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B. Private Equity Funds 
A Private Equity (PE) fund is an investment vehicle in which a fund 
manager pools investors’ capital and invests the fund’s assets.106  PE 
funds are extremely significant to the global economy.107  In 2017, PE 
funds raised $453 billion,108 and in 2017, PE funds had over $2.8 trillion 
of assets under management.109  PE funds are relatively hands-on in 
the context of private investment funds, as they typically take a 
controlling interest in an operating company, commonly referred to as 
a portfolio company, and engage actively in the management of the 
business.110  In general, PE funds invest in private companies and focus 
on improving operations or cutting unnecessary expenses.111  PE fund 
managers strive to increase the value of businesses in order to profit 
off of a later sale.112  Like other private investment vehicles, a PE fund 
is managed by a fund manager, who is typically compensated according 
to the two and twenty compensation structure.113  Thus, PE fund 
managers earn most of their income from carried interest and are an 
intended target of Section 1061.114 
Despite its seemingly significant three-year holding period 
requirement, Section 1061 has very little practical effect for funds that 
invest long-term, like PE funds.115  The very nature of a PE fund’s 
investments involve a long-term focus, and sales made by PE fund 
managers may not occur until many years after the initial investment.116  
In fact, only 27% of investments by PE funds fell under the three-year 
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holding requirement in 2017.117  Thus, the three-year minimum holding 
requirement of Section 1061 is largely irrelevant for PE funds, as they 
typically hold investments for more than five years.118 
Moreover, relatively straightforward tax planning nullifies the 
effects of Section 1061 for PE funds.119  In its definition of “specified 
assets,” Section 1061 does not include operating businesses.120  Thus, if 
a PE fund invests in various operating business joint ventures and 
issues a carried interest, it will likely not fall within the purview of 
Section 1061.121  Specifically, Section 1061(c)(3) requires an 
examination of the activities of the joint venture to determine if the 
issuer of the carried interest is in possession of a specified asset.122  
Thus, if a PE fund solely invests in joint ventures only engaged in 
operating businesses, any resulting carried interest should not be 
subject to Section 1061.123 
Furthermore, a PE fund might be able to structure its investments in 
such a way as to further minimize the effects of Section 1061.124  
Holders of carried interest — especially PE fund managers — might 
acquire stock in a particular company, commonly referred to as a 
platform company.125  When considering Section 1061’s three-year 
holding period requirement, the investor will want to meet this three-
year threshold as quickly as possible.126  One area that might cause 
problems is the issuance of new stock.127  Specifically, the issuance of 
new stock would trigger a new holding period under Section 1061 and 
reset the three-year clock.128  Thus, investors might be able to pay for 
additional capital for add-on investments with pro-rata capital 
contributions instead of the traditional issuance of additional stock.129  
If pro-rata capital contributions are impractical, investors might be 
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able to avoid issuance of new stock by funding additional capital needs 
with debt.130 
One potential structure would be to designate an LLC or LP as a 
holding company over the particular corporate portfolio company.131  
In the event that additional funding is necessary for an add-on 
investment at the portfolio company, private investment fund 
managers could structure such funding at the holding company level.132  
This structure would allow fund managers to contribute funds to the 
capital of the corporate portfolio company without issuing any new 
stock and triggering a new three-year holding period requirement.133  
Thus, provided that the stock complies with the three-year holding 
period requirement, the capital gain on the sale of the portfolio stock 
would flow through to the holding company’s owner and a PE fund 
would be able to sell the stock without Section 1061 implications.134 
An even simpler planning technique, especially applicable to PE 
funds with blocks of portfolio company stock, is the strategic timing of 
sales.135  Specifically, if there are blocks of such investments, funds can 
choose to time the sale or redemption of the stocks to ensure that 
stocks are not sold until they satisfy the three-year holding period 
requirement.136  This strategy would be relatively straightforward, as 
PE funds typically hold assets for longer than three years.137  Therefore, 
such a strategy would not require extensive tax planning. 
C. Hedge Funds 
A hedge fund is an investment vehicle in which a hedge fund 
manager pools investors’ capital and invests in a variety of securities 
and equities to generate a positive return.138  Investors include 
institutions like pension funds, high-net-worth individuals, or even the 
managers themselves.139  In 2018, hedge funds had approximately $3.2 
trillion under management, making them a significant force in the 
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global economy.140  Similar to PE fund managers, hedge fund managers 
are typically compensated according to the two and twenty structure.141  
Thus, the 20% of fund managers’ compensation that consists of carried 
interest is potentially subject to Section 1061.142 
Section 1061 fails to address carried interest distributions from 
hedge funds.143  Since hedge funds usually hold investments for less 
than one year, hedge fund managers typically were not receiving 
preferential tax treatment of carried interest under the previous tax 
law.144  However, for those few hedge funds that hold investments for 
longer periods, Section 1061 is still easy to circumvent.145  One 
relatively straightforward tax planning strategy that might minimize 
Section 1061’s effects upon hedge funds involves transferring carried 
interest to “unrelated parties.”146  Specifically, Section 1061 states that: 
(2) Related person.  For purposes of this paragraph, a person is 
related to the taxpayer if — 
(A) the person is a member of the taxpayer’s family within the 
meaning of section 318(a)(1), or 
(B) the person performed a service within the current calendar 
year or the preceding three calendar years in any applicable trade 
or business in which or for which the taxpayer performed a 
service.147 
Section 318(a)(1) defines “related parties” as an individual’s 
“spouse (other than a spouse who is legally separated from the 
individual under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance) and his 
children, grandchildren, and parents.”148  Thus, the related party 
definition in Section 1061 does not include attribution from 
partnerships, estates, trusts, and corporations.149  Solely including 
immediate family members and current or recent fund management 
colleagues without attribution rules creates a very significant tax 
planning consideration for private investment fund managers.150 
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These related party classifications allow private investment fund 
managers to utilize tax planning strategies to avoid Section 1061’s 
three-year holding requirement.151  Specifically, a distribution would 
only trigger Section 1061 if it was transferred directly to a related 
party.152  Since the attribution rules of Section 318(a)(2) are clearly 
omitted from the statute, a fund manager might be able to transfer 
carried interest to an entity owned by a related party and the related 
party would be able to avoid the three-year holding requirement.153  
Importantly, the transferee-entity would need to be regarded as a 
taxpayer in a manner that is separate from the particular related 
party.154  Although the related party classifications will capture some 
transactions, these classifications are clearly narrow and enable private 
investment fund managers to avoid the restrictions of Section 1061.155 
Under Section 1061, hedge fund managers and all private investment 
fund managers may avoid the three-year holding requirement by 
distributing appreciated partnership assets as a form of carried 
interest.156  The fund manager would then be free to sell the 
appreciated assets and avoid Section 1061’s three-year holding 
requirement.157  These various tax planning strategies make it clear 
that Section 1061 will likely not have a significant effect upon the 
taxation of carried interest, especially when considering that private 
investment fund managers have access to some of the most capable 
attorneys and accountants.158  Section 1061 fails to achieve a 
substantive revision of the taxation of carried interest because 
elementary tax planning allows fund managers to avoid any restrictions 
imposed.159  The preferential tax treatment of carried interest remains 
controversial, as both critics and proponents of this preferential tax 
treatment present strong arguments in favor of and opposing tax 
reform in this area.160 
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II. THE GREAT TAX DEBATE 
Given the trillions of dollars of assets under management and 
extraordinarily high income flowing to fund managers, it is 
unsurprising that the taxation of carried interest is highly controversial 
within tax law.161  When evaluating an aspect of tax law, it is helpful to 
evaluate tax policy, fiscal policy, and general public policy.162  The 
primary tax policy considerations include vertical equity, horizontal 
equity, economic neutrality, and administrability.163  Vertical equity is 
based upon the idea of taxing different taxpayers progressively, 
meaning taxing individuals at higher rates relative to income.164  
Horizontal equity focuses upon taxing similar earners uniformly.165  
Economic neutrality concentrates upon avoiding the influence of 
taxpayer preferences due to taxation.166  Lastly, administrability 
focuses upon the practicability — the difficulty of implementation and 
enforcement.167  Furthermore, the four primary fiscal policy 
considerations include economic growth, economic stability, raising 
revenue for expenditures, and increased employment.168  As discussed 
in the Sections below, both critics and proponents of the current tax 
treatment of carried interest make arguments based on these factors,169 
and raise strong points and help to illustrate the importance of the 
taxation of carried interest to tax law in general. 
A. The Critics of the Preferential Tax Treatment of Carried Interest 
Critics of the preferential tax treatment of carried interest are quite 
vocal regarding their dissatisfaction with the current tax law.  For 
example, when discussing the need to reform the taxation of carried 
interest, President Obama pointed out that “the top 25 hedge fund 
managers made more than all the kindergarten teachers in the 
country.”170  Furthermore, President Trump referred to hedge fund 
managers as “paper pushers” and claimed they were “getting away 
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with murder,” partly due to the preferential tax treatment of carried 
interest.171  Moreover, Professor Victor Fleischer declared that “the 
status quo treatment of a profits interest in a partnership is no longer a 
tenable position to take as a matter of sound tax policy.”172 
Critics primarily rely upon a variety of tax policy rationales in 
claiming that carried interest should be taxed as ordinary income.173  
They argue that taxing carried interest as ordinary income would 
increase vertical equity, as the extremely wealthy investment fund 
managers would pay tax at a higher rate; this higher tax rate is more 
appropriate for their high income levels under a progressive tax 
model.174  Moreover, these wealthy investment fund managers are 
financially able to pay this higher rate of taxation because of their 
significant compensation packages.175  This idea of taxing higher 
income earners at a higher tax rate is the basis of our progressive 
income tax system, and vertical equity clearly points to carried interest 
tax reform.176 
Similarly, critics also claim that taxing carried interest as ordinary 
income aligns with horizontal equity.177  Specifically, taxing carried 
interest as ordinary income would put fund managers on the same basis 
as other similarly situated service-providing taxpayers.178  Critics adopt 
what is called the “labor services view,” in which carried interest should 
be taxed as ordinary income, as it most closely resembles wages.179  
Economists consider most of carried interest to be performance-based 
compensation for the general partners rather than a return of 
previously invested capital as the tax code currently treats it.180  Carried 
interest is paid to private investment fund managers as an 
incentivization device similar to the bonus-heavy compensation 
structure in investment banking.181  Investment bankers and other 
professionals pay ordinary income tax rates on their salaries and 
bonuses.182  Furthermore, for most service providers, their income is 
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treated as ordinary income and taxed at the applicable rates.183  Thus, 
critics believe carried interest should be treated as ordinary income, 
notwithstanding that the underlying investments generate capital 
gains.184 
Moreover, commentators also argue that taxing carried interest as 
ordinary income would be best for economic neutrality.185  Specifically, 
critics claim that the preferential tax treatment of carried interest is 
persuading individuals to become investment fund managers instead of 
pursuing other careers as potential doctors, lawyers, and scientists, for 
example.186  Thus, commentators argue that this is problematic on an 
economic neutrality basis, as the tax law should not have such a 
significant impact upon taxpayer decision-making, and there is no need 
to encourage individuals to become investment fund managers.187 
Commentators also argue the ease of administrability and 
enforcement shows that carried interest should simply be taxed as 
ordinary income.188  Specifically, commentators can claim that taxing 
carried interest as ordinary income would be relatively easy for the 
government.189  If carried interest is simply treated as ordinary income, 
the government would no longer need to track investment holding 
periods related to carried interest taxation or request as much 
investment information for investment fund managers’ individual tax 
returns.190  Moreover, there would be no need to determine which 
portion of carried interest constitutes labor income and investment 
income as required by various proposals.191  Carried interest would 
simply be categorized and taxed as ordinary income without any of 
these additional steps.192 
Critics also rely on a variety of fiscal policy rationales to show the 
benefits of treating carried interest as ordinary income.193  Specifically, 
commentators who criticize the current law claim that taxing carried 
interest as ordinary income would raise significant tax revenues.194  It 
is estimated that private investment funds currently have over $2 
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trillion under management.195  Thus, the gains made upon such a large 
principle have significant tax revenue implications.  It is very difficult 
to ascertain the tax revenue implications of treating carried interest as 
ordinary income, as carried interest is based upon fund performance 
relying on numerous economic factors.196  By some estimates, taxing 
carried interest as ordinary income would raise as much as $180 billion 
over ten years.197  Critics identify public programs that could be funded 
or governmental debt that could be paid down with such an increase in 
tax revenues.198 
Critics also rely on general public policy-based arguments. 
Specifically, critics emphasize the public outrage of the preferential tax 
treatment of carried interest.199  Famed investor and philanthropist 
Warren Buffet, has made public comments emphasizing the 
ramifications of the preferential tax treatment of carried interest.200  
Buffet found it absurd that private investment fund managers might 
pay taxes at a lower effective tax rate “than our receptionists do or our 
cleaning ladies.”201  Critics also point to general morality and 
distributive justice-based arguments.202  Distributive justice-based 
arguments focus on the apportionment of goods in consonance with the 
best interests of society.203  Thus, critics point to the distributive justice 
concerns that the tax law allows some of the world’s wealthiest 
individuals to pay a lower effective tax rate than middle-class 
earners.204  Critics claim such a reality is both untenable and unfair.205 
B. The Proponents of the Current Carried Interest Tax Law 
Proponents of the tax treatment of carried interest as long-term 
capital gains rely on their own tax policy, fiscal policy, and general 
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public policy-related arguments.206  In terms of tax policy, proponents 
of the current tax law claim that treating carried interest as a long-term 
capital gain satisfies horizontal equity.207  Specifically, proponents of 
the current tax law advocate for the “entrepreneurship view” that 
carried interest serves as a reward for fund managers who help new 
ventures prosper, businesses improve, and create greater business 
value.208  Proponents emphasize the similarity of managing a private 
investment fund to the work of entrepreneurs that start new businesses 
and treat a portion of their returns as capital for contributing “sweat 
equity.”209  Specifically, since it is so difficult to measure the 
performance of sweat equity, the American tax system usually allows 
labor income to be converted to capital.210  Thus, proponents claim 
carried interest should be treated as long-term capital gains, like the 
gains of angel investors and entrepreneurs who risk financial capital 
and sweat equity in businesses.211 
Proponents, including fund managers themselves, make another 
horizontal equity-based argument by claiming that carried interest is 
more appropriately taxed as a long-term capital gain because it is 
completely dependent upon the vicissitudes of the markets.212  If a fund 
manager does not make the right investments and as a result does not 
reach the agreed upon profitability threshold, he or she will not receive 
carried interest.213  Unlike an attorney’s or banker’s compensation, 
carried interest has this commonality with sales of securities and other 
transactions treated as capital gains.214  Although bonuses and certain 
salary agreements are not always guaranteed, carried interest’s 
additional and significant reliance upon market forces renders it more 
appropriately taxed as a capital gain.215 
Furthermore, proponents of the current carried interest tax law 
claim that any perceived horizontal inequity resulting from the taxation 
of carried interest stems from the preferential tax treatment of long-
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term capital gains.216  Specifically, proponents claim that carried 
interest taxation is simply an application of the tax code to a particular 
situation.217  The large tax savings derived from the current system 
should not be dealt with by adjusting carried interest tax law.  Instead, 
the issue should be addressed by revising the tax treatment of long-
term capital gains generally.218  Thus, proponents claim that dealing 
with preferential capital gains tax rates directly would be more 
effective and efficient than disturbing existing carried interest tax 
law.219 
Proponents of the current tax law also emphasize the ease of 
administrability and enforcement of simply leaving carried interest 
taxation alone.220  Specifically, these proponents claim that treating 
carried interest as a long-term capital gain does not put any extreme 
logistical strain on the IRS.221  Proponents emphasize that the current 
tax treatment of carried interest avoids any intensive factual analysis 
requiring research and fact gathering.222  Therefore, treating carried 
interest as a long-term capital gain avoids the need to differentiate 
between labor and investment income or to deduce which income was 
generated by investment services partnerships or other types of 
partnerships.223 
Proponents of the preferential tax treatment of carried interest also 
rely upon the basic principles of partnership taxation.224  Specifically, 
proponents claim that the basic principles underlying Subchapter K 
clearly support the preferential tax treatment of carried interest.225  As 
codified in Subchapter K, partnership tax law as a whole is designed to 
tax partners in a manner similar to which they would be taxed at the 
individual level.226  If general partners of private investment funds 
directly invested in portfolio companies, or purchased and sold shares 
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of public companies for a profit, it is clear that any profits received 
would be characterized as capital gains.227  For example, if instead of 
raising capital by receiving contributions from limited partners, general 
partners simply borrowed money from limited partners and then used 
these loans as contributions to the fund, it is likely that any profits 
generated would be treated as capital gains.228  Proponents claim that 
since the general partner would be viewed as the owner of the 
borrowed funds, any investments made would be viewed as direct 
investments by the general partner and any profits would be 
characterized as capital gains.229 
Furthermore, proponents emphasize that the flow-through taxation 
of partnerships can be a significant advantage and fundamental reason 
for choosing to form a partnership.230  Moreover, proponents state that 
partnership tax law is designed to permit investors to conduct 
businesses, including investment-related businesses, in a flexible 
arrangement without any additional entity level tax.231  Proponents 
claim these fundamental principles indicate that any investment 
income earned by private investment fund managers must keep its 
capital characterization regardless of any labor performed to produce 
such returns.232 
Proponents also rely on an array of fiscal policy rationales to 
maintain the current tax treatment of carried interest.233  In terms of 
economic growth, proponents emphasize that higher taxes generally 
impede economic growth by stifling economic investment and 
entrepreneurship.234  Moreover, proponents claim applying a higher 
tax rate to carried interest would be far above the revenue maximizing 
tax rate.235  These proponents argue that private investment funds help 
fuel businesses, help businesses become more efficient, and create 
jobs.236  Thus, proponents claim that changing the preferential tax 
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treatment might cause funds to relocate or close, which will hurt 
economic growth.237 
Proponents also emphasize that the current tax treatment of carried 
interest enhances economic stability.238  Specifically, proponents 
emphasize that billions of dollars are contributed into private 
investment funds each year,239 and moreover, investment funds have 
trillions of dollars under management.240  Increasing the tax rate on 
carried interest could cause private investment fund managers to invest 
less into funds.241  Furthermore, an increase in the taxation of carried 
interest might cause private investment fund managers to charge a 
higher rate of carried interest to offset higher taxes, causing investors 
to invest less to avoid these higher fees and a decrease in contributions 
might decrease returns to investors.242  Thus, proponents claim that 
reformation of the current carried interest law would create significant 
economic instability, as the increase in taxation of carried interest 
might cause an overall reduction in contributions to private investment 
funds.243 
Furthermore, proponents also claim that taxing carried interest as 
ordinary income would not significantly raise tax revenues.244  
Specifically, they point to studies performed by the Joint Committee 
on Taxation, which estimate that such a tax change would only raise 
about $14 billion from 2019 through 2028.245  Moreover, with a national 
debt of $22 trillion, these proponents emphasize that such small 
revenues would have a minimal practical effect on the national 
budget.246  Furthermore, proponents go even further by claiming that 
increasing the taxation of carried interest would actually decrease tax 
revenues.247  Specifically, these proponents claim that tax reform in this 
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area would disincentivize fund investment activity and lead to less tax 
revenues due to decreased fund revenues.248 
Proponents of the current tax treatment of carried interest also claim 
that tax reform in this area would reduce employment in the American 
financial sector.249  Since an increase in taxation would potentially 
reduce the amount of capital contributed to private investment funds, 
the funds available to maintain employment levels would also be 
reduced.250  Thus, proponents claim that carried interest tax reform 
would potentially lead to an outsourcing of jobs to foreign nations that 
have more favorable tax codes, decreasing employment and tax 
revenues in the process.251 
Lastly, proponents of the current tax treatment of carried interest 
highlight the issue of investor fairness.252  Investors and private 
investment fund managers negotiate these fee arrangements, which are 
often very extensive and likely involve high agency costs.253  A central 
aspect of the fee arrangement involves the current preferential taxation 
of carried interest.254  Proponents claim altering this significant area of 
tax law will assign risk to investors who have already negotiated these 
agreements, fundamentally altering the economic relationships of 
investors and managers.255  Specifically, since agreements usually 
involve clawback and tax distribution provisions, proponents claim a 
change in the taxation of carried interest might cause fund managers to 
make riskier investments.256  Therefore, a change in the taxation of 
carried interest would essentially cause a shifting of risks to investors 
without any consideration.257  Proponents claim altering the current tax 
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treatment of carried interest would produce unintended and indirect 
economic consequences to parties who contracted under the current 
tax law.258 
III. MODERATE REFORM AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO URBAN AREAS 
Although both critics and proponents of the preferential tax 
treatment of carried interest make strong arguments, a compromise is 
clearly necessary.  Carried interest should be neither solely taxed as a 
capital gain nor as ordinary income.  A moderate revision of Section 
1061 would allow legislators to effectively balance the incentivization 
benefits of the preferential tax treatment of carried interest, while also 
taxing more carried interest at ordinary income rates.  An increase in 
the holding period requirement from three years to a period in the 
range of five to seven years, a more expansive definition of “related 
parties,” and bringing other investment types under its purview are 
potential avenues to consider.259  Furthermore, the importance of 
private investment funds is especially evident in urban areas.  Thus, 
legislators must be especially cognizant of the economic growth that 
funds bring to cities and states, such as New York City and New 
York.260 
A. Section 1061: A Balancing Act 
While both sides of the debate on the carried interest taxation law 
present strong arguments, neither side is completely correct.  If carried 
interest is solely taxed as a capital gain, the government will lose tax 
revenues and public outrage would continue to be significant.261  Yet, 
if carried interest is taxed as ordinary income, individuals might not 
enter the industry or invest in certain urban areas.262  Thus, instead of 
solely taxing all carried interest as ordinary income or completely 
retaining the preferential tax treatment, the appropriate middle ground 
would be to strengthen Section 1061 by increasing its holding period 
requirements, expanding its definition of related parties, and bringing 
different investment types under its purview. 
The three-year holding period requirement of Section 1061 must be 
increased to have any significant effect upon private investment fund 
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managers, especially PE fund managers.263  Legislators, however, must 
also weigh the potential disincentivizing effects that a long holding 
period requirement may have upon fund managers.264  A potential 
solution would balance the public benefits of a longer holding period 
requirement with the drawbacks and incentivization issues associated 
with a longer holding period.265  Since PE fund managers generally 
hold investments for much longer than three years, the current version 
of Section 1061 is virtually ineffective.266  Although it is difficult to 
calculate an optimal holding period requirement, a holding period of 
five to seven years would be sufficient, as it is sufficient time to capture 
certain activities of fund managers, but it is not overly restrictive.267  
For example, in 2017, only 27% of PE fund investments were held for 
less than three years268 — the median holding period of PE fund 
investments was around 5.2 years.269 
Therefore, a five- to seven-year holding period would bring certain 
PE and hedge fund managers under the purview of Section 1061, 
allowing the statute to have a meaningful impact upon the taxation of 
carried interest.270  Nonetheless, PE fund managers who hold 
investments longer than the five- to seven-year holding period would 
still be rewarded with the preferential tax treatment of carried 
interest.271  Moreover, for hedge funds, a holding period of five to seven 
years would continue to have a small effect upon hedge funds that focus 
upon very short-term investments (such as less than one year), as these 
fund managers already fall under the purview of Section 1061.272  Yet, 
a five- to seven-year holding period requirement would affect hedge 
fund managers who hold investments for an intermediate period of 
time (five to seven years).273  Furthermore, such a holding period would 
still allow hedge fund managers who hold investments for longer than 
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five to seven years to enjoy the preferential tax treatment of carried 
interest.274 
The definition of “related parties” in Section 1061 should also be 
revised to explicitly bring in the Section 318(a)(2) attribution rules to 
define a “related party.”275  Section 1061 currently opens the door for 
fund managers to avoid Section 1061 by having relatives or colleagues 
create certain legal entities.276  Specifically, because the attribution 
rules from partnerships, estates, trusts, and corporations are currently 
absent from Section 1061, a private investment fund manager can 
distribute carried interest directly to a business entity owned by a 
related party and, thus, avoid Section 1061’s holding period 
requirements.277  If the Section 318(a)(2) attribution rules from 
partnerships, estates, trusts, and corporations applied, then fund 
managers could not contribute their carried interests to such entities.278 
Additionally, due to the sophistication of fund managers, legislators 
should consider further expanding the definition of “related parties” to 
include “siblings,” “aunts,” and “uncles.”279  Moreover, revising 
Section 1061’s “related party” section to include persons who 
performed a service within the preceding ten calendar years would 
make Section 1061 more effective.280  Section 1061’s “related parties” 
section only includes former colleagues of the previous three years, 
allowing fund managers to have former colleagues assist them in 
avoiding the restrictions.281  Thus, classifying all colleagues within the 
previous ten calendar years as “related parties” would avoid this 
possibility by requiring a longer period to pass before such transactions 
would be considered to be at arm’s length.282  The “related parties” 
definition in Section 1061 should not leave any options open for fund 
managers to circumvent Section 1061 by employing such tax planning 
strategies.283 
An additional, necessary revision to strengthen Section 1061 
involves bringing direct investments in operating businesses under its 
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purview.284  Specifically, an operating business produces goods or 
services, whereas a holding company only owns assets.285  Currently, 
the specified assets of Section 1061 do not include investments in 
operating businesses,286 allowing private investment fund managers to 
avoid Section 1061 by solely investing in joint ventures engaged in 
operating businesses.287  Since governments want to encourage 
investing in operating businesses for job creation purposes, a similar 
balancing act would be required.  Categorizing investments in 
operating businesses as specified assets under Section 1061 would not 
be overly effective, as many private investment funds hold investments 
in operating businesses for long periods (i.e., more than three years) to 
improve operations before an eventual sale.288  Therefore, these 
investments would easily satisfy the holding period requirements under 
the current version of Section 1061.289  Yet, adding operating business 
investments into Section 1061’s specified assets would cover any 
opportunities for fund managers to purchase an operating business for 
a quick sale.290  Thus, categorizing investments in operating businesses 
as specified assets along with the aforementioned holding requirement 
of five to seven years would effectively balance tax revenue 
considerations with potential incentivization issues.291 
Another potential revision that would strengthen Section 1061 while 
maintaining certain incentivization benefits is designating a specified 
percentage of carried interest as ordinary income and a specified 
percentage as capital gains.292  Senator Sander Levin’s 2009 proposal 
attempted to strike such a balance.293  In what was planned to become 
I.R.C. Section 710, a fixed percentage of any partnership distribution 
to private investment fund managers was characterized as ordinary 
income notwithstanding the original character of the income or 
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whether it led to preferential long-term capital gains tax treatment.294  
Similarly, it would have allowed a certain percentage of carried interest 
to retain its pass-through capital gains character.295  The 2009 Levin 
Bill proposed a 75/25 split, where 75% of profits allocated to private 
investment fund managers based on profits interest would be taxed at 
the higher ordinary income rates and 25% would maintain pass-
through capital gains tax treatment.296 
Although Section 710 received great criticism, utilizing a revised 
fixed-percentage treatment in Section 1061 would be effective.297  
Considering the failure of the 2009 Levin Bill, a more politically 
acceptable breakdown could be a 50/50 split.298  Under this structure, 
50% of profits allocated to private investment fund managers based on 
profits interest would be taxed as ordinary income, and a maximum of 
50% would retain the preferential long-term capital gains tax 
treatment, if applicable.299  Specifically, the potential capital gains 
portion should solely be characterized as a long-term capital gain if it 
would be considered a long-term capital gain under Section 1061’s 
three-year holding period requirement.300  Thus, this revision would 
establish a proposed maximum portion of the carried interest that 
could potentially be treated as a long-term capital gain if an interest 
has been held for at least three years.301  Any remainder under the 50% 
ceiling not held for a minimum of three years would be taxed as 
ordinary income.302  As a result, the federal government would gain 
additional tax revenues, and private investment fund managers would 
retain significant tax advantages.303 
B. New York City: The Private Investment Funds Capital 
Although private investment funds are primarily focused upon 
generating returns for investors and managers, their investment 
activities also have positive impacts on cities and localities.304  The 
presence of private investment funds is most significant in New 
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York.305  Estimates indicate that 40% of all hedge fund managers are 
based in New York State.306  Moreover, these New York-based hedge 
funds manage 60% of all assets under management worldwide.307  To 
illustrate the significance of such an amount, hedge fund managers in 
Connecticut, often referred to as the hedge fund capital of the world, 
manage only 8% of assets under management worldwide.308 
Private investment funds directly employ 134,000 New York State 
residents.309  Direct employees include fund managers, research 
analysts, investor relations personnel, compliance teams, in-house legal 
counsel, tax teams, information technology teams, and many other 
positions.310  Since the investment fund industry requires outside 
services, it has a “ripple through” effect, including the employment of 
third parties that the fund hires to perform tasks.311  Specifically, 
investment funds require outside consultants, lawyers, accountants, 
analysts, etc.312  Thus, when factoring in these indirectly-created jobs, 
the investment fund industry employs an additional 236,000 New 
Yorkers with an average salary of over $200,000.313  In total, the 
investment fund industry accounts for more than 370,000 jobs and $4.5 
billion in compensation.314  These salaries are then spent, invested, and 
saved, creating even more economic growth in the Empire State.315 
Private investment funds also contribute significantly to state and 
local tax revenues.316  Specifically, the industry accounts for a 
significant amount of New York state and local taxes paid.317  These 
state and local taxes include a variety of different taxes.318  High 
earners employed by investment funds usually pay high individual 
income tax rates.319  Similarly, if corporations are paid, these entities 
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also pay income taxes to states and localities.320  Furthermore, private 
investment funds also pay sales taxes, property taxes, social insurance 
taxes, and any other necessary fees.321  These amounts are very 
significant to state and local budgets, as research suggests that the 
private investment funds industry contributes almost $4.5 billion per 
year to New York state and local tax revenues.322 
Moreover, private investment funds also invest directly into many 
New York companies, such as Nature’s Bounty Company and 
Carestream.323  PE funds invest in many of these New York-based 
businesses, help to improve management and efficiency, and make the 
businesses more profitable.324  In fact, American Investment Council 
research suggests that PE funds invested about $343.11 billion in New 
York companies from 2008 to 2018.325  Perhaps more importantly, 
these companies employed over 200,000 citizens.326 
Furthermore, private investment funds can earn above-market 
returns for investors.327  This is especially significant to states and cities 
given that pension funds account for 47% of private equity fund 
investors.328  In fact, the New York State Common Retirement Fund 
and the New York City Public Pension Fund, two of the State’s largest 
public pension funds, have invested $26 billion in PE funds.329  
Moreover, out of all of the New York State Common Retirement 
Fund’s asset classes, private equity investments are the highest 
returning asset class over both the short and long term.330  In 2019, the 
New York State Common Retirement Fund enjoyed an 18.7% return 
on private equity investments.331  The evidence suggests that private 
investment funds are helping city residents retire and save.332 
In addition to these more obvious benefits of private investment 
funds, there are other less readily recognizable benefits.333  For 
example, New York State’s tech sector accounts for a significant 
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portion of the State’s economy and has supported the development of 
newer and larger companies.334  An important reason for the rise of 
tech in New York City is access to capital, primarily from New York’s 
various private investment funds.335  Carried interest tax reform might 
cause private investment funds to leave the United States, which might 
lead these tech companies to also relocate to nations with more access 
to capital.336  Moreover, carried interest tax reform might also lead to 
new funds choosing to locate elsewhere.337  Thus, the now bountiful tax 
base from carried interest and businesses could decrease dramatically, 
leaving New York State and New York City deprived of billions of 
dollars of tax revenues.338 
Furthermore, private investment fund managers have grown to 
become not only some of New York City’s highest income earners, but 
also the City’s biggest philanthropists.339  The competitive nature for 
which the industry is known has led investment fund managers to invite 
colleagues and competitors into philanthropic efforts and has created 
a competitive cycle.340  Not only do fund managers try to outperform 
one another in the workplace, but they also strive to out-give one 
another, which has led charities to raise record amounts.341  As uber-
wealthy private investment fund managers look for charitable causes, 
many are attracted to local causes in New York City.342  Moreover, 
these private investment fund managers are looking to be involved and 
take a hands-on approach to helping charities grow.343  Thus, this leads 
them to turn to more community-based charities.344 
Private investment fund managers founded and maintained some of 
the most well-known and influential New York City charities.345  The 
Robin Hood Foundation, which is famous for fighting poverty in New 
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York City, was founded by Larry Robbins, founder of Glenview 
Capital Management.346  The Robin Hood Foundation’s charity galas 
have included 4000 guests and raised up to $32 million.347  Robin Hood 
supports New York City’s Brooklyn Kindergarten Society, which helps 
New York parents get involved at a daycare center, and Abraham 
House Providing, which provides educational services to the children 
of incarcerated individuals in the Bronx.348 
As the private investment fund industry grows, its other charitable 
endeavors continue to focus on helping New York City residents.349  In 
2005, Dan Stern, who runs Reservoir Capital, organized a charity event 
at Lincoln Center for the Hedge Fund Council featuring Jon Stewart, 
then-host of The Daily Show.  The event attracted many well-known 
private investment fund managers, and in total, it raised $1.4 million 
for Lincoln Center.350  Private investment fund managers have also 
created philanthropic organizations through industry groups, such as 
Hedge Fund Cares, which has donated more than $15 million to 
organizations fighting child abuse.351 
Despite these various benefits of investment funds, many of the 
nation’s most significant states and cities are in debt and in dire need 
of tax revenues.352  Specifically, New York State is currently $56.3 
billion in debt, according to the full accrual accounting method under 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).353  Moreover, in 
2018, New York City’s debt burden grew to $119 billion.354  New York’s 
debt has a compounding factor because it has led to higher debt service 
costs.355  In fact, for city-supported debt, debt service costs alone were 
nearly 11% of city tax revenues in 2018.356  Thus, initiating a higher tax 
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upon carried interest might seem tempting to not only federal, but also 
New York State and New York City governments. 
Given the variety of benefits which private investment funds bring 
to New York State and New York City and corresponding debt levels, 
the taxation of carried interest will continue to be a significant concern 
for not only national, but also state and local governments.357  When 
legislators reform the current tax treatment of carried interest, they will 
need to balance the benefits that private investment funds provide to 
New York State and New York City, as well as the need to pay down 
rising debt levels.358  Thus, the taxation of carried interest is especially 
relevant to New York State and New York City, and this debate will 
continue for years to come. 
CONCLUSION 
Private investment fund managers are some of the wealthiest people 
in the world.359  Fund managers are usually compensated according to 
a two and twenty compensation arrangement.360  The 2% of the 
compensation is deemed a management fee and is taxed as ordinary 
income at a rate of approximately 40%.361  The 20% component is 
composed of a profits interest and is colloquially referred to as carried 
interest.362  Carried interest can rise to extremely high amounts.363  If 
fund managers hold the underlying asset for less than three years, the 
resulting carried interest is taxed as a short-term capital gain at a 
maximum rate of approximately 40%.364  Controversially, if fund 
managers hold the underlying asset for more than three years, it is 
currently taxed as a long-term capital gain at a maximum rate of around 
20%.365 
In response to years of public outrage, the IRS implemented Section 
1061, which requires private investment fund managers to hold carried 
interests for three years to qualify for long-term capital gains tax 
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treatment.366  If this three-year holding period is not met, the carried 
interest is taxed at the higher short-term capital gains rate.367  Although 
Section 1061 includes this increased holding period requirement, the 
revision is not without its flaws.368  Some relatively straightforward tax 
planning strategies and the general nature of certain private investment 
funds to hold assets for far longer than three years make the statute 
relatively insignificant.369 
Instead, legislators should revise Section 1061 to make it more 
effective.370  Increasing the holding period requirement from three 
years to a period in the range of five to seven years would make Section 
1061 more effective.371  An increased holding period might capture 
investments of private investment funds known for holding 
investments for long terms, such as PE funds.372  Moreover, legislators 
should expand Section 1061’s definition of “related parties,” 
particularly by adding the attribution rules of Section 318(a)(2), which 
disallows easy tax avoidance strategies.373  Legislators should also 
consider categorizing investments in operating businesses as specified 
assets under Section 1061, as such a revision would bring more PE fund 
managers into its purview.374  Furthermore, legislators should 
categorize a certain percentage of a carried interest as ordinary income 
and a certain maximum percentage as long-term capital gains 
income.375  Specifically, legislators should allow a predetermined 
percentage of carried interest to be taxed as long-term capital gains 
provided that the manager satisfies Section 1061’s three-year holding 
period requirement for an amount up to a maximum of 50% of the 
carried interest.376  This potential 50/50 split would classify a 
meaningful amount of carried interest as ordinary income, but such a 
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moderate reform would still preserve some preferential tax treatment 
to continue to incentivize fund managers.377 
Despite the potential benefits of taxing carried interest at higher 
rates, legislators must still consider the many benefits that private 
investment funds bring to urban areas.  New York City is home to some 
of the world’s largest private investment funds.378  The private 
investment funds industry creates substantial economic growth in New 
York State.379  These private investment funds create jobs, pay taxes, 
and make large charitable donations to many of the City’s significant 
charities.380  Nonetheless, national, state, and city debt levels have 
risen, and there is a need for more tax revenues, which can potentially 
be generated by carried interest tax reform.381 
The debate on the taxation of carried interest will continue in the 
coming years.  Both critics and proponents of the current tax treatment 
of carried interest raise strong arguments.382  As in many areas of tax 
law, there may not be a clear answer in the carried interest taxation 
debate.383  The public needs lawmakers to address the various issues 
and consider all options.384  To successfully reform the taxation of 
carried interest, legislators should revise Section 1061 in a way that 
balances the needs of society.385  Section 1061 should do a more 
effective job of taxing carried interest at ordinary income tax rates, 
while also incentivizing private investment fund formation and its 
many societal benefits.386 
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